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Abstract
This paper analyzes the interrelation between men’s gender role attitudes and
female labor supply decision. Following Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004), I
argue that the recent increases in the female labor market participation rate are
driven by the growing proportion of men who were brought up in a family with
a working mother. First, the paper reexamines the results of the cross-section
analysis of Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) using the Swiss Household Panel
2005 to illustrate that married women whose mothers-in-law were working are
themselves significantly more likely to be in the labor force. In a second step, the
paper attempts to test one of their model’s crucial mechanisms and show that the
effect of a wife’s labor market integration on her husband’s well-being diverges
depending on the former labor market status of his mother. Taken together, this
evidence can be interpreted as varying preferences for women with high labor
market integration due to exposure to certain sexual stereotypes early in life.
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1 Introduction
The situation of women in the Swiss labor market has changed profoundly in recent
decades. At the beginning of the 20th century, female labor force participation rates were
very low and women tended to leave the labor market briefly after marriage. Whereas in
1900 less than 30% of the women living in Switzerland were employed (see FSO, 1940),
the female labor force participation rate was 74% in 2005 (see FSO, 2005). Moreover,
the rate of women combining a career and young children has increased from 48% to
67% in the last 20 years (see FSO, 2005).
What are the reasons behind this change and the increased presence of women in the
labor market? Smith and Ward (1985) study longer-term trends since 1900 for the US
labor market and find that rises in real wages increased the attractiveness of working
in the labor market relative to housekeeping. In their model, this rise in real wages
explains 60% of the total increase in the number of employed women. Goldin (1992)
argues that men are employed mainly in the industry sector, which was restructured
significantly during the last century due to technological changes, whereas women are
employed primarily in the service sector. The service sector is not only growing rapidly,
it is also better protected from international competition and the relocation of produc-
tion. Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) focus their discussion on married or
cohabiting women. They argue that new consumable durables such as washing machines
and vacuum cleaners reduced the workload of running a household significantly. The
newly invented machines reduced the time spent on housework and allowed the home-
maker to participate in the labor market. As suggested by Goldin and Katz (2002), oral
contraceptives made a woman’s investment in an occupational career more worthwhile.
Women could control their fertility using birth control pills and determine whether to
focus on a professional life or a family.
In this paper, I follow Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) and argue that changes
in men’s preferences and gender role attitudes are a significant factor in the increase in
female labor market participation rates over time. As gender role preferences are estab-
lished early in life (see, e.g., Thornton, Alwin, and Camburn, 1983) while children are
exposed mainly to their parents as role models, the mother’s labor market status may
affect the acceptance of working women in the next generation. Hence, the argument sug-
gests that the labor market status of a mother serves as a determinant of a man’s attitude
toward an employed wife. Consequently, the increasing number of men who were raised
by working mothers who combine children and a career, makes investments in education
and professional skills for women in the following generation more worthwhile and aug-
ments female labor supply. This argument is related to the theory of intergenerational
transmission of traits as well as the analysis of the relation between working mothers
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and the gender role attitudes of their offspring: as formulated by Bisin and Verdier
(2001), parents socialize their children by transmitting their own preferences. Therefore,
a child’s position toward women is mainly modeled by his or her own experiences with
the role of his or her mother. On the other hand, Powell and Steelman (1982) find
that the association between maternal status characteristics and gender role attitudes
of adult men is stronger than for adult women. Thus, working mothers set an example
for their sons and determine their sons’ preferences for a working wife. Kawaguchi and
Miyazaki (2009) replicate some of the results of Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004)
using Japanese data from 2000 to 2003. They find no statistically significant evidence
that men raised by full-time working mothers are more likely to have full-time working
wives. However, their results show that men raised by full-time working mothers are
more likely to respond negatively to traditional gender stereotypes.
In their theoretical model, Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) outline possible
reasons why the labor market status of a married woman might be affected, ceteris
paribus, by the former labor market status of her mother-in-law: based on the argument
outlined above, being raised by a working mother might influence a boy’s attitudes toward
gender roles and in particular toward female labor force participation. It is therefore
assumed that all men have the same set of household skills, but differ in preferences
toward being married to an employed woman. To distinguish between the preferences
of the two types of men, Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) introduce a new term in
married men’s utility function—the disutility of having a working wife. This disutility
of having a working wife differs systematically between the two types of men: whereas
women’s labor market activities have a direct negative effect on the utility function
of men who grew up with a mother working solely at home, the disutility of having
a working wife is zero for men who were raised by mothers participating in the labor
market. Hence, an increase in the presence of the new type of men, ones who were raised
by a working mother, enhances the marriage probability for skilled women and therefore
leads to higher investments in professional skills and greater female participation in the
labor market over time.
Besides influencing a man’s preferences for a working wife, Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and
Olivetti (2004) state that being raised by a working mother might also make a son a
better partner for a woman participating in the labor market. Thus, working mothers
might affect their sons’ set of household skills and their ability to cooperate in the
household. Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) do not attempt to investigate whether
the preference channel outlined above or the endowment channel is the reason why men
differ according to the work status of their mothers, but rather attempt to find empirical
evidence that they do. In this paper, the endowment channel is not considered and only
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the mechanism of the preference channel is analyzed.
As noted above, the preference channel mechanism relies on the assumption that the
utility functions of men who were raised by a working mother are different from the
utility functions of men who were raised by a mother attributing time only to house-
hold production. To test this assumption, I therefore introduce a satisfaction estimation
similar to Bonke and Browning (2009). They examine the distribution of financial satis-
faction within a household empirically and find that the wife’s contribution to household
income has a negative effect on her husband’s material well-being. I suggest that this
negative influence on the husband’s well-being is dependent on gender role attitudes and
thereby also on the labor market status of the husband’s mother, and analyze this by
estimating a series of discrete response modes.
The contribution of this paper is to examine how the effect of women’s contribution
to household income on men’s satisfaction differs depending on the former labor market
status of their mothers. First, I reexamine the results of Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti
(2004) that married women whose mothers-in-law were working are themselves signifi-
cantly more likely to be in the labor force using Swiss data. Using a similar set of control
variables as Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004), the results are similar qualitatively
and indicate that the probability that a man’s wife is employed is correlated positively
with whether the man’s mother worked during his childhood. Second, I attempt to test
the validity of one of the model’s crucial mechanisms. I use the same database to exam-
ine married men’s degree of satisfaction depending on their mothers’ former employment
status and show that the wife’s contribution to household income affects her husband’s
satisfaction negatively when he was raised by a mother who worked exclusively at home.
The share the wife contributes to household income has, however, no significant impact
on the well-being of men who were raised by working mothers. Taken together, the re-
sults indicate that a mother’s work experience affects her son’s gender role attitudes and
the labor force participation rate of married women in the next generation. Moreover,
this result can also be interpreted as evidence for the preference channel interpreta-
tion as the relevant dynamic mechanism behind the increase in the female labor market
participation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief
overview of the data used in this paper. The differences in the labor participation decision
of women depending on the employment status of their mothers-in-law are discussed in
Section 3. Using ordered probit models, I analyze in Section 4 the effect of the wife’s
contribution to household income on her husband’s satisfaction. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data
The data used in this study are taken from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP hereafter)
conducted in 2005. This panel survey is representative of the Swiss residential pop-
ulation and covers a broad range of social fields. The survey collects both objective
and subjective data and therefore provides information about financial resources, labor
market status as well as attitudes and satisfaction with various life domains of all in-
dividuals within a household. Furthermore, the survey collects information regarding
the respondent’s life at age 15. These questions include the labor market status of both
parents and parents’ educational background. I focus on married couples exclusively.1
As Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti’s (2004) model assumes that all husbands are working,
I exclude all couples with husbands who are not in the labor force or unemployed. To
ensure the comparability of the income variable, self-employed respondents are excluded.
Furthermore, to ensure that most individuals in the dataset might still be in the labor
force, I only select couples where the husband is below 50 years of age. This leaves a
sample of 682 households.
The dependent variables in the two models are (i) women’s labor force status and (ii)
men’s satisfaction with life as well as men’s satisfaction with their financial situation.
Women are reported to be in the labor force if they were paid for working for a minimum
of one hour as an employee during the week prior to the interview. The SHP includes
several questions on different aspects of subjective well-being. The satisfaction measure
is obtained from the following two questions about the individual’s general and financial
satisfaction:
“In general, how satisfied are you with your life?”
“How satisfied are you with your financial situation?”
The possible responses range from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (fully satisfied). I assume
that the degree of satisfaction is comparable across respondents. As different individu-
als may have different interpretations of the scale, this assumption is crucial. However,
satisfaction questions have been validated repeatedly by psychologists (see, e.g., Kahne-
1Conditioning on marital status raises the question of whether men growing up in traditionally
structured households with a mother working solely at home might be significantly more or less likely
to get married or divorced than the new type of men who grew up with a working mother. Using the
same survey data, however, I find no empirical evidence that men who grew up with a mother working
solely at home are more likely to get married or divorced. This result also holds when controlling for a
list of personal characteristics and parental background variables.
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man, Diener, and Schwarz, 1999) and also discussed in the economic literature (see, e.g.,
Van Praag and Frijters, 1999, for a survey).2
The models consist of the following control variables: wife’s and husband’s age in the
survey year, education measured in three categories corresponding to tertiary, secondary,
and primary education, yearly total personal net income in the census year, household
income, number of children and language region. To control for the socioeconomic status
of an individual, I use fathers’ and mothers’ education.
As outlined above, the mother’s former labor market status serves as a proxy for
the husband’s gender role attitudes and is included in the estimation of women’s labor
supply decision. In contrast with Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004), who classify a
mother as working if she has worked for at least one year before the son turned 14 years
old, the SHP only provides information on whether a mother worked when the son was
15 years old. More precisely, individuals were asked whether their mother was actively
occupied when they were 15 years old; based on this question, I construct the former
work status of an individual’s mother. As a mother may want to stop working during
her son’s early childhood and go back to work when he is in school, it is feasible that
some mothers are classified as working even though they were not working when their
sons were small children. Hence, the definition of the labor market status of the wife is
an important difference to the data used by Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004). In
the satisfaction estimation, I include the wife’s contribution to household income, i.e.,
the fraction of household income that is contributed by the female household member,
as a measure of the wife’s labor market integration.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the person- and household-specific character-
istics included in the empirical analysis. The current female labor market participation
rate in the sample is 75%. Considering that older individuals were excluded, this number
corresponds to today’s labor market participation rate in Switzerland. The participation
rate of the husbands’ mothers was only 48%. The mean of wife’s household income con-
tribution is 19.6% and the median is 17.8%. Figure 1 and Figure 2 present histograms
of the men’s financial satisfaction and satisfaction with life according to their mother’s
former work status. For both satisfaction measures, the median lies at a satisfaction
level of 8. Whereas 25% of the male individuals report a financial satisfaction of 6 or
below, only less than 10% of the male individuals report a life satisfaction of 6 or below.
2See also Section 4 for a more detailed discussion
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Means and (standard deviations)
Women Men
Mother not Mother
Variables in labor force in labor force
In labor force 0.738
Net personal income 35272.8 95552.9 92716.3
(28500.9) (61896.5) (77856.1)
Age 39.1 39.7 38.5
(6.1) (6.1) (6.0)
Primary education 0.109 0.125 0.094
Secondary education 0.661 0.648 0.673
Tertiary education 0.230 0.227 0.233
German speaking 0.686 0.713 0.662
French speaking 0.264 0.224 0.299
Italian speaking 0.050 0.062 0.039
Mother in labor force 0.529
Mother-in-law in labor force 0.487
Primary education father 0.226 0.221 0.230
Secondary education father 0.515 0.533 0.499
Tertiary education father 0.260 0.246 0.271
Primary education mother 0.459 0.542 0.385
Secondary education mother 0.481 0.417 0.537
Tertiary education mother 0.060 0.040 0.078
Number of children 1.683 1.688 1.679
(1.1) (1.1) (1.1)
Female income contribution 21.1 23.2
(26.8) ( 26.0)
Number of households 682 350 332
Notes: Married women are reported to be in the labor force if they were paid for
working for a minimum of one hour as an employee during the week prior
to the interview. Mothers are classified as working if they were in the labor
force when their children were 15 years old. The wife’s income contribution
measures the ratio of the total household income contributed by the wife.
Figure 1: Husband’s Satisfaction with Financial Situation
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Figure 2: Husband’s Satisfaction with Life
3 Labor Force Participation Decision
The objective of this section is to analyze a married woman’s labor force participation
decision depending on the work status of her mother-in-law. In particular, I show that
controlling for several labor market characteristics and socioeconomic background, the
former work status of a married man’s mother affects the likelihood that his wife works
positively.
Based on the literature (see Becker, 2005), the labor force participation of married
women is modeled as a function of age, education, husband’s income and the number of
children. To measure the influence of the husband’s gender role preferences on the female
work decision, I use the husband’s mother’s work status as a proxy for his attitudes. To
exclude the possibility that the correlation of interest is only driven by a variety of
background factors, the husband’s education and age as well as the former labor market
status of the wife’s mother are included in the estimations. Furthermore, a mother’s
intention to work as well as her attitudes toward market and household production
might be correlated with a family’s socioeconomic background. I therefore control for
socioeconomic background by including the education of the parents into the regression
equation. Moreover, Switzerland has four official languages that are spoken in different
areas. The cultural gap between the two main language groups German and French is
also reflected in a higher female labor force participation rate and smaller female wage
gap in the French-speaking region. For example, if a man who grew up in the French-
speaking region where women are more likely to work marries a French-speaking woman,
this might create a positive effect for the variable of interest. Hence, dummy variables
for the language regions within Switzerland are included.
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I estimate the following discrete response model:
Pw = x1β + P
hmδ + e, e ∼ N(0, 1).
The dependent latent variable Pw indicates the labor market participation decision of
the wife. The dummy variable P hm equals 1 if the husband’s mother worked when her
son was 15 years old and x1 represents a vector of control variables.
The estimated OLS coefficients and marginal effects3 after probit are given in Ta-
ble 2. Models (i) and (ii) are estimated using OLS. Whereas, regression (i) measures the
unconditional effect of the labor force status of the husband’s mother on the labor force
participation decision of his wife, regression (ii) controls for further covariates. Regres-
sion (iii) is a standard labor force participation estimation. Regressions (iv) and (v) are
extensions of the basic model including the labor market status of the husband’s and the
wife’s mother and a variety of other control variables. Regressions (vi), (vii) and (viii)
are robustness tests.
I find that a married woman’s labor market participation decision is positively and
significantly related to whether her mother-in-law had worked. Thus, having a mother-
in-law who was working raises the chances that a wife with mean characteristics is partic-
ipating in the labor market by seven to eight percentage points. Even when controlling
for a variety of background variables, the marginal effect of the indicator variable indicat-
ing whether the husband’s mother had worked remains significant. Compared with the
results of Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004), the effects presented in this paper seem
rather small.4 Possible reasons for these differences are the differences in the definition
of the mother’s labor market status, country-specific differences or cohort differences, as
the individuals examined in this paper are substantially younger than the sample ana-
lyzed by Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004). The findings, however, are qualitatively
the same and indicate that the former labor market status of a husband’s mother is an
important factor determining the working decision of his wife.
Apart from the labor market status of the mother-in-law, the participation decision
is also determined significantly by education, the number of children and some proxy
variables for the socioeconomic background of the husband’s or the wife’s family. As the
first child might not have the same impact on the labor force participation decision as the
second or third child, the regression includes dummy variables for the number of children.
3All marginal effects are computed at the means of the independent variables. For presentational
reasons, no probit coefficients are reported.
4The values for the pseudo R2 are comparable to most values reported by Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and
Olivetti (2004), but not to the models using broader specifications including regions of residence or
income of a husband’s family at age 16.
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Table 2: Female Labor Market Participation
OLS Probit
Independent variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Husband’s mother in labor force 0.071* 0.075* 0.082* 0.083** 0.074* 0.072* 0.073*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033)
Wife’s age 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.019 0.012 0.088* 0.003
(0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.039) (0.036) (0.039) (0.024)
Wife’s age squared -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0009* -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Primary education wife 0.031 0.027 0.029 0.034 0.032 -0.028 0.019
(0.056) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.057) (0.042)
Tertiary education wife 0.011* 0.098** 0.075 0.071 0.092 0.175* 0.018
(0.041) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.047) (0.030)
Wife’s mother in labor force -0.002 -0.011 -0.009 -0.002 -0.013 -0.005
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.032)
Husband’s income -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0013** -0.0005
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Husband’s age -0.032 -0.044 -0.024 0.024
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.031)
Husband’s age squared 0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Primary education husband 0.113 0.120 -0.073 0.031
(0.082) (0.081) (0.101) (0.075)
Tertiary education husband -0.013 -0.008 -0.025 -0.038
(0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.026)
One child -0.150** -0.181** -0.198** -0.189** 0.031 -0.157**
(0.054) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.055) (0.022)
Two children -0.160** -0.185** -0.198** -0.191** -0.118* -0.191**
(0.051) (0.055) (0.063) (0.054) (0.049) (0.030)
Three children -0.226** -0.268** -0.285** -0.283** -0.080 -0.141**
(0.061) (0.072) (0.071) (0.070) (0.057) (0.020)
Four or more children -0.169 -0.225* -0.223* -0.245* -0.101 -0.121
(0.096) (0.114) (0.113) (0.111) (0.082) (0.098)
Primary education wife’s father 0.013 0.009 0.010 0.028 0.090 0.008
(0.039) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.050) (0.030)
Tertiary education wife’s father 0.061 0.056 0.047 0.044 0.060 0.003
(0.054) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.046) (0.030)
Primary education wife’s mother 0.017 0.023 0.033 0.026 -0.050 0.025
(0.044) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.027)
Tertiary education wife’s mother 0.124** 0.158** 0.165** 0.156** 0.103 0.0226**
(0.045) (0.057) (0.055) (0.058) (0.082) (0.055)
Primary education husband’s father -0.114* -0.119* -0.037 -0.025
(0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.028)
Tertiary education husband’s father 0.019 0.019 -0.006 0.039
(0.042) (0.042) (0.016) (0.031)
Primary education husband’s mother -0.044 -0.041 -0.016 0.012
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.025)
Tertiary education husband’s mother -0.178 -0.158 -0.024 -0.023
(0.092) (0.093) (0.081) (0.043)
Constant 0.703** 0.312
(0.023) (0.590)
Number of households 682 682 682 682 682 682 682 682
Log likelihood -381.73 -375.14 -365.04 -375.02 -387.33 -187.99
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.007 0.0375 0.028 0.044 0.070 0.069 0.082 0.182
Notes: Marginal effects are calculated at the means of the independent variables. The dependent variable is a binary variable
indicating whether a married woman is in the labor force. Married women are reported to be in the labor force if they
were paid for working a minimum of one hour as an employee during the week prior to the interview. In column (vii) and
(viii), married women are reported to be in the labor force if they work at least 50% or full-time, respectively. Mothers
are classified as working if they were in the labor force when their children were 15 years old. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. */** Statistically significant at the 5-/1-percent level.
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Having one or two children reduces the probability for labor market participation by
approximately 20 percentage points compared with women without children; having
three children lowers the probability of being in the labor force by approximately 30
percentage points. Moreover, a married woman’s probability of participating in the
labor market is significantly higher for women with tertiary education compared with
women with secondary education. Interestingly, the former labor market status of a
wife’s mother does not influence a married woman’s labor market participation decision.
The education of a wife’s mother, however, can be a crucial determinant.
As the number of children is an endogenous variable, regression (vi) excludes the
number of children. The main result that married women’s labor market participation
is positively and significantly affected by the labor market status of her mother-in-law
remains. Moreover, the result might be sensitive to the definition of a woman being in
the labor force. As noted above, women are reported to be in the labor force if they
work for a minimum of one hour during the week prior to the interview. Therefore, other
definitions of being in the labor force are used in regressions (vii) and (viii). In regression
(vii), women are reported to be in the labor force if they work 50% or more. In regression
(viii), women are reported to be in the labor force if they work full-time. The effect of
former labor market status of the mother-in-law on the probability of whether a married
woman is working is slightly smaller when using the two alternative definitions, but the
effect is still significantly positive and the main result remains.
4 Satisfaction with Life and Financial Situation
As noted above, the mechanism of the preference channel relies on the assumption that
compared with the new type of men who grew up with a working mother, the traditional
type of men who were raised by mothers working only in the household has a disutility
of having a working wife. In this section, I show that a man’s well-being is affected
negatively by the wife’s income contribution and thereby also by the wife’s labor market
participation. I further present evidence that this negative correlation is only true for
men who grew up in a traditionally structured household.
The analysis of satisfaction follows the conventional satisfaction literature (see, e.g.,
Frey and Stutzer, 2002, for a survey). In a subjective view of utility, individuals’ happi-
ness can be captured by asking individuals about their well-being. It is therefore possible
to get indications of individuals’ valuation of their life satisfaction with the help of a sin-
gle question. The basic assumption that utility can be measured by subjective well-being
can be criticized on several grounds. First, utility is an ordinal concept and cannot be
measured on a cardinal scale and second, utility can be measured but interpersonal com-
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parisons are not valid. The first issue can be addressed by the fact that such satisfaction
measures have been validated repeatedly by psychologists to be a reasonable proxy for
utility or well-being (see, e.g., Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz, 1999). In the economic
literature, Easterlin (1974) claims that answers to subjective satisfaction questions pro-
vide valid proxies for happiness or utility (see also Frey and Stutzer, 2002, for a recent
overview). Moreover, Van Praag claims that subjective income evaluation questions can
be used to estimate utility functions, i.e., the answers to these questions are valid proxies
of utility and produce credible evidence for the usefulness of the satisfaction measures for
empirical welfare analysis (see Van Praag and Frijters, 1999, for a survey). With respect
to the second criticism, it can be argued that individuals are given a well-defined scale
for their evaluation including verbal descriptions. Therefore, it is plausible that they
reply in a comparable manner. At least, this approach seems to work well in a variety
of settings (see, e.g., Diener and Suh, 1997).5
McBride (2001) and Clark and Oswald (1996) introduce relative income measure-
ments and income comparison levels in the satisfaction estimation. Bonke and Browning
(2009) focus on the financial situation of married couples and include the wife’s contri-
bution to household income in their estimation model. Based on their finding that the
wife’s contribution to household income is correlated negatively with men’s satisfaction
level, I estimate an ordered probit model based on the following specification:
Sh = x2β + rγ + I(t)δ + r × I(t)η + e, e|x2 ∼ N(0, 1).
The husband’s latent satisfaction level is given by Sh, x2 represents a vector of husband-
and household-specific control variables, r measures the wife’s contribution to household
income and I(t) is an indicator variable stating whether the men are of the traditional
type growing up with a mother who was not in the labor force. The main coefficients of
interest are γ, which measures the effect of the wife’s income contribution on her hus-
band’s satisfaction and η the coefficient of the interaction term, which indicates whether
there are differences in the effect of the wife’s income contribution depending on work
status of the husband’s mother.
The results of the ordered probit estimation for men are given in Table 3.6 Control-
ling for various personal characteristics, I find that a man’s satisfaction with his financial
5As mentioned above, Switzerland has different language regions. As individuals can choose to
be interviewed in either German, French or Italian, the verbally defined scale might be understood
differently in the different language regions. Therefore, I also control for the language regions in the
satisfaction estimation.
6Columns (ii) to (iv) and (vi) to (vii) report the estimated coefficients from the ordered probit
regressions.
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Table 3: Men’s Satisfaction with Life and Financial Situation
Financial Satisfaction General Satisfaction
OLS Ordered Probit OLS Ordered Probit
Independent variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Wife’s income contribution (i) -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Mother not in labor force (ii) -0.034 -0.021 -0.020 -0.023 0.018 0.005 0.011 0.009
(0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.131) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121)
Interaction term (i× ii) -0.026** -0.021** -0.023** -0.022** -0.021** -0.021**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Log(household income) 0.749** 0.649** 0.644** 0.671** 0.334** 0.278** 0.229** 0.264**
(0.088) (0.088) (0.094) (0.097) (0.094) (0.087) (0.093) (0.089)
Husband’s age -0.012 -0.008 -0.011 -0.010 0.004 0.017 0.044 0.044
(0.141) (0.092) (0.092) (0.087) (0.103) (0.094) (0.097) (0.099)
Husband’s age squared 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Primary education husband 0.281 0.064
(0.252) (0.258)
Tertiary education husband 0.037 0.131
(0.086) (0.088)
French-speaking husband -0.518** -0.349** -0.358** -0.352** -0.121 -0.112 -0.110 -0.114
(0.139) (0.091) (0.092) (0.088) (0.101) (0.093) (0.093) (0.086)
Italian-speaking husband 0.051 -0.049 0.030 -0.048 0.346 -0.321 -0.315 -0.314
(0.281) (0.184) (0.185) (0.182) (0.201) (0.188) (0.189) (0.179)
Log(number of children) -0.176 -0.103
(0.129) (0.091)
Constant -1.321 4.500*
(0.939) (2.22)
Number of households 682 682 682 682 682 682 682 682
Log likelihood -1201.3 -1199.4 -1271.6 -1005.2 -1003.5 -1006.5
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.126 0.065 0.077 0.059 0.113 0.079 0.096 0.077
Notes: Satisfaction with financial situation and satisfaction with life are the dependent variables. The responses for these subjective
satisfaction measures range from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (fully satisfied). The wife’s income contribution measures the
ratio of total household income contributed by the wife and is scaled between 0 and 100. Husband’s mothers are classified
as not working if they were not in the labor force when their sons were 15 years old. The interaction term is constructed by
interacting the wife’s income contribution and the binary variable indicating whether or not the mother was working when
her son was 15 years old. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. */** Statistically significant at the 5-/1-percent
level.
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situation as well as his satisfaction with his life in general increases significantly with per-
sonal income in all of the various model specifications. In addition, French-speaking men
report significantly lower financial satisfaction than German-speaking men. The main
focus of the analysis is on the wife’s contribution to household income and in particular
whether the effect differs for the two types of men: the wife’s income contribution affects
the well-being of men negatively but the effect is not significant. The most important
finding is, however, that the coefficient of the interaction term of the wife’s income con-
tribution and the indicator variables as to whether the mother was in the labor force or
not is significantly negative for both outcome variables.7 This indicates that the negative
impact is only significant for the group without working mothers independent of model
specifications. For all men who grew up with an employed mother, the percentage of
income the wife contributes to household income has no significant effect on the degree
of satisfaction. Thus, men’s self-reported well-being decreases as a function of the wife’s
contribution to household income only for those men whose mother did not work outside
the home. Moreover, growing up in a traditionally structured household does not affect
the level of general or financial satisfaction significantly. These findings hold even when
the wife’s contribution to household income and the interaction term are excluded (see
columns (iv) and (viii)). The fact that there are no significant differences in general or
financial satisfaction according to the mother’s work status might infer similar expecta-
tions about financial situation and general well-being among both types of men. Thus,
men growing up with mothers who are not participating in the labor market do not seem
to be generally less happy individuals but their well-being is affected differently by their
wives’ contribution to household income.8
Assuming that the wife’s contribution to household income is a valid proxy for the
time a woman attributes to labor market activity, the results can be interpreted as
evidence for a systematic difference in men’s utility functions. These findings support
the crucial assumption that men’s preferences toward women who are integrated in the
labor market diverge depending on the former labor market status of their mothers.
Hence, the presented results can be interpreted as evidence for the preference channel
interpretation as the relevant dynamic mechanism behind the increase in the female
7Although the effect of the interaction term on men’s satisfaction is statistically significant, the size
of the effect is rather small. If a wife’s contribution to household income is increased by 10 percentage
points, the probability that a man who grew up with a mother working solely in the household provides
a satisfaction value of 8, 9 or 10 is reduced by 2.5, 2.6 or 5.9 percentage points, respectively. The
probability of answering 7 or lower is increased if the wife’s contribution is increased.
8The main result does not depend on the estimation method. Qualitatively, the same effects are
found using OLS estimation (as reported in Table 5), POLS estimation, generalized ordered probit and
semi-nonparametric ordered probit.
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labor market participation rate over time and support the inclusion of the labor market
participation of the mother-in-law into the female labor market participation decision.
4.1 Robustness Analysis
Five different tests are conducted in the robustness analysis. The main results are sus-
tained in each of the tests. First, I analyze whether the main results are robust to a
binary classification of the satisfaction variable. Second, an alternative satisfaction mea-
sure, the satisfaction with the way housework is shared, is used to analyze if the results
are robust to a third measure of subjective well-being. As a third robustness test, I
use a different measure of the wife’s labor market integration by replacing the wife’s
income contribution by a binary variable for a different definition of having a working
wife. Fourth, the satisfaction analysis is also repeated for women and finaly, I repeat
the satisfaction estimation for cohabiting couples because conditioning on marital status
raises the possibility that selection bias affects estimates in the selected sample.
4.1.1 Binary Classification of Satisfaction
As a response to the satisfaction question, a score of 8 might not be meaningfully different
from a response of 7; I analyze whether the main results are robust to a classification
where satisfaction is measured as a binary indicator. Thus, individuals with a subjective
satisfaction level of 6 or higher are classified as ‘satisfied,’ whereas individuals who report
a lower satisfaction are classified as ‘not satisfied.’ The marginal effects after probit are
given in Table 4. For both satisfaction measures, the results are qualitatively in line
with the main results discussed above: the wife’s contribution to household income has a
negative effect on the probability that men are generally satisfied or satisfied with their
financial situation. However, the negative effect is only significant for men who grew up
in a traditionally structured household.
4.1.2 Satisfaction with Why Housework is Shared
The Swiss Household Panel provides further measures of satisfaction. To analyze whether
the results are robust to a third measure of well-being, I use the answer to the question
‘To what extent are you satisfied with the way the housework is shared (washing, cooking,
cleaning) within your household?’. The results of the ordered probit estimation are given
in Table 5. Similar to financial and general satisfaction, men’s satisfaction with how the
housework is shared is affected negatively by the wives’ share of household income and
again the effect is only significant for men who grew up in a traditional household with
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Table 4: Binary Classification
Financial Satisfaction General Satisfaction
Independent variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Wife’s income contribution (i) -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Mother not in labor force (ii) 0.056 0.052 -0.011 -0.012
(0.043) (0.051) (0.008) (0.009)
Interaction term (i× ii) -0.012** -0.015** -0.009** -0.012**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Log(household income) 0.252** 0.229** 0.062** 0.054**
(0.040) (0.039) (0.013) (0.018)
Husband’s age 0.002 0.002 -0.012 -0.010
(0.022) (0.037) (0.013) (0.020)
Husband’s age squared -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Primary education husband 0.113 -0.009
(0.078) (0.053)
Tertiary education husband 0.076* 0.021
(0.036) (0.019)
French-speaking husband -0.132** -0.129** -0.005 -0.002
(0.044) (0.041) (0.003) (0.021)
Italian-speaking husband -0.032 -0.041 -0.021 -0.009
(0.034) (0.084) (0.013) (0.043)
Log(number of children) -0.033 0.012
(0.039) (0.020)
Number of households 682 682 682 682
Log likelihood -370.7 -368.0 -163.4 -162.6
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.067 0.072 0.046 0.049
Notes: Satisfaction with financial situation and satisfaction with life are the depen-
dent variables. Individuals with a subjective satisfaction level of 6 or higher
are classified as ‘satisfied,’ whereas individuals who report a lower satisfaction
are classified as ‘not satisfied.’ Marginal effects are calculated at the means
of the independent variables. The wife’s income contribution measures the
ratio of total household income contributed by the wife and is scaled between
0 and 100. Husband’s mothers are classified as not working if they were not
in the labor force when their sons were 15 years old. The interaction term
is constructed by interacting the wife’s income contribution and the binary
variable indicating whether or not the mother was working when the son was
15 years old. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. */** Statistically
significant at the 5-/1-percent level.
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a mother working solely at home. These results again indicate that there is a systematic
difference in men’s well-being based on their mother’s work status.
Table 5: Satisfaction with Housework
OLS Ordered Probit
Independent variables (i) (ii) (iii)
Wife’s income contribution (i) -0.003 -0.014 -0.011
(0.004) (0.013) (0.009)
Mother not in labor force (ii) 0.106 0.027 0.074
(0.167) (0.118) (0.123)
Interaction term (i× ii) -0.014** -0.021** -0.039**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Log(household income) -0.104 -0.058 0.060
(0.121) (0.090) (0.096)
Husband’s age -0.071 -0.036 0.034
(0.132) (0.097) (0.101)
Husband’s age squared 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0005
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Primary education husband 0.091
(0.270)
Tertiary education husband -0.316
(0.091)
French-speaking husband -0.219 -0.159 -0.176
(0.130) (0.095) (0.095)
Italian-speaking husband 0.191 0.249 0.274
(0.263) (0.203) (0.204)
Log(number of children) -0.287**
(0.095)
Number of households 682 682 682
Log likelihood -1042.3 -1031.5
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.027 0.043 0.138
Notes: Results for ordered probit estimations. Satisfaction with how house-
work is shared is the dependent variable. The responses for these
subjective satisfaction measures range from 0 (not satisfied at all) to
10 (fully satisfied). The wife’s income contribution measures the ra-
tio of total household income contributed by the wife and is scaled
between 0 and 100. Husband’s mothers are classified as not working
if they were not in the labor force when their sons were 15 years old.
The interaction term is constructed by interacting the wife’s income
contribution and the binary variable indicating whether or not the
mother was working when her son was 15 years old. Standard er-
rors are reported in parentheses. */** Statistically significant at the
5-/1-percent level.
4.1.3 Wife’s Work Status
To analyze whether the size of the wife’s income contribution and thereby the degree
of the wife’s labor market integration matters, I replace the wife’s income contribution
with a binary variable indicating whether the wife is working as a further robustness
test. I use the same definitions of being in the labor force as in Section 3. Thus, the
first definition classifies women as in the labor force if they work for a minimum of one
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hour during the week prior to the interview, the second definition reports women as in
the labor force if they work 50% or more and the third definition reports women as in
the labor force if they work full-time.
The results are presented in Table 6. Using the first definition of being in the labor
force, I find no significant effect of having a working wife on husband’s well-being. More-
over, the effect is also not significantly different for the two types of men. This indicates
that there is no negative impact of the wife’s work status on men’s satisfaction if women
are defined as working even with a very low level of labor market integration. However,
using the second and third definitions of being in the labor force and only considering
women as working who spend a substantial number of hours in the labor market (i.e.,
more than 50% or full-time), the results are qualitatively in line with the results using
the wife’s contribution to household income as a measure of her labor market integration.
Hence, the wife’s work status negatively affects the well-being of men but the negative
effect is only significant for the group without working mothers. For all men who grew
up with an employed mother, the indicator variable as to whether the wife is in the
labor force has no significant effect on the degree of financial satisfaction or satisfaction
with life in general. These results indicate that men’s preferences toward employed wives
diverge depending on the former labor status of their mothers.
4.1.4 Women’s Satisfaction with Life and Financial Situation
The satisfaction analysis is also repeated for women because the share one partner con-
tributes to household income might simply reflect their bargaining power within the
household (see, e.g., Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene, 1994; Lundberg,
Pollak, and Wales, 1996). The results are reported in Table 7. Comparing the estimates
for men and women, there are some commonalities but also some marked differences.
The main common feature is that both general and financial satisfaction strongly in-
crease with household income, albeit slightly more strongly for women. The negative
effect of belonging to the French-speaking minority on financial well-being is larger for
men. However, French-speaking women are also significantly less satisfied with their life
in general, while general satisfaction does not differ significantly between German- and
French-speaking men. In contrast with men, women’s satisfaction with life and their fi-
nancial situation is not affected significantly by their contribution to household income.9
The effect is not significant for the combined sample or any of the two groups—women
who married a traditional type of man or a new type of man. Thus, there is no empiri-
cal evidence that the satisfaction of married women is affected by their contribution to
9This reflects the results of Bonke and Browning (2009), who find that the wife’s share has a signifi-
cantly negative, linear impact on the husband’s satisfaction but no linear effect on the wife’s satisfaction.
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Table 6: Wife’s Work Status
One Hour for Pay 50% or More Full-time
Financial General Financial General Financial General
Satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction
Independent variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Wife in labor force (i) -0.200 -0.098 -0.016 -0.194 -0.075 -0.166
(0.110) (0.074) (0.092) (0.125) (0.085) (0.237)
Mother not in labor force (ii) 0.254 -0.088 0.167 -0.058 0.124 -0.038
(0.137) (0.060) (0.095) (0.098) (0.082) (0.084)
Interaction term (i× ii) -0.217 -0.061 -0.183** -0.049** -0.167** -0.039**
(0.121) (0.046) (0.072) (0.018) (0.064) (0.013)
Log(household income) 0.655** 0.233** 0.575** 0.239** 0.559** 0.222**
(0.096) (0.095) (0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.091)
Husband’s age 0.028 0.041 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.040
(0.095) (0.097) (0.095) (0.097) (0.095) (0.097)
Husband’s age squared -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Primary education husband 0.222 0.052 0.157 0.024 0.175 0.053
(0.251) (0.258) (0.251) (0.258) (0.251) (0.258)
Tertiary education husband 0.039 0.130 0.059 0.136 0.058 0.134
(0.086) (0.088) (0.086) (0.088) (0.086) (0.088)
French-speaking husband -0.380** -0.115 -0.353** -0.082 -0.367** -0.108
(0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.095) (0.092) (0.094)
Italian-speaking husband 0.008 -0.323 0.069 -0.288 0.046 -0.322
(0.186) (0.190) (0.186) (0.190) (0.186) (0.190)
Log(number of children) -0.111 -0.090 -0.099 0.097 -0.082 -0.093
(0.087) (0.089) (0.087) (0.089) (0.087) (0.089)
Number of households 682 682 682 682 682 682
Log likelihood -1007.7 -1003.1 -1008.8 -1002.2 -1009.9 -1003.5
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.067 0.072 0.046 0.049 0.043 0.138
Notes: Results for ordered probit estimations. Satisfaction with financial situation and satisfaction with life are the de-
pendent variables. The responses for these subjective satisfaction measures range from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10
(fully satisfied). A husband’s wife is defined as working if she got paid for working for a minimum of one hour as
an employee during the week prior to the interview (columns (i) and (ii)), if she works at least 50% (columns (iii)
and (iv)) or full-time (columns (v) and (vi)), respectively. Husband’s mothers are classified as not working if they
were not in the labor force when their sons were 15 years old. The interaction term is constructed by interacting the
binary variable indicating the labor force status of the wife and the binary variable indicating whether or not the
mother was working when her son was 15 years old. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. */** Statistically
significant at the 5-/1-percent level.
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household income nor that this effect differs systematically according to the work status
of their mother-in-law.
Table 7: Women’s Satisfaction with Life and Financial Situation
Financial Satisfaction General Satisfaction
Independent variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Interaction term -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Wife’s income contribution -0.006 0.007 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Husband’s mother 0.003 -0.089 0.003 0.007
not in labor force (0.011) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119)
Log(household income) 0.678** 0.689** 0.649** 0.319** 0.320** 0.326**
(0.088) (0.088) (0.013) (0.087) (0.087) (0.089)
Wife’s age 0.039 0.039 0.058 -0.152* -0.154* -0.112
(0.070) (0.070) (0.075) (0.072) (0.072) (0.077)
Wife’s age squared -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 0.002* 0.002* 0.001
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Primary education wife -0.151 -0.059
(0.131) (0.132)
Tertiary education wife 0.087 -0.066
(0.101) (0.102)
French-speaking wife -0.301** -0.297** -0.292** -0.230* -0.229* -0.226*
(0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094)
Italian-speaking wife -0.453* -0.454* -0.440* -0.326 -0.329 -0.313
(0.185) (0.186) (0.187) (0.187) (0.203) (0.188)
Log(number of children) -0.060 0.054
(0.093) (0.044)
Number of households 682 682 682 682 682 682
Log likelihood -1258.9 -1258.5 -1257.0 -1072.3 -1072.1 -1070.6
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.032 0.034 0.036 0.024 0.025 0.027
Notes: Results for ordered probit estimations. Satisfaction with financial situation and satisfaction
with life are the dependent variables. The responses for these subjective satisfaction measures
range from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (fully satisfied). The wife’s income contribution
measures the ratio of total household income contributed by the wife and is scaled between 0
and 100. Husband’s mothers are classified as not working if they were not in the labor force
when their sons were 15 years old. The interaction term is constructed by interacting the
wife’s income contribution and the binary variable indicating whether or not the mother was
working when her son was 15 years old. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. */**
Statistically significant at the 5-/1-percent level.
4.1.5 Marital Status
As discussed in Section 2, there is no empirical evidence that men who grew up with a
mother working solely at home have a different likelihood to getting married or divorced
than men who were raised by a working mother. However, conditioning on marital
status raises the possibility that selection bias affects estimates in the selected sample as
happier singles are more likely to marry (see Stutzer and Frey, 2006). As a robustness
check, I therefore repeat the satisfaction estimation for the cohabiting couples. The
effects presented in Table 8 are smaller for cohabiting men but the general result does
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not change qualitatively and leads to the same conclusion: A man’s well-being is affected
negatively by the size of his wife’s contribution to household income if he was raised in
a traditionally structured household.
Table 8: Cohabiting Men’s Satisfaction with Life
Financial Satisfaction General Satisfaction
OLS Ordered Probit OLS Ordered Probit
Independent variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Wife’s income contribution (i) -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Mother not in labor force (ii) -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.006
(0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.145) (0.147) (0.138) (0.140)
Interaction term (i× ii) -0.016** -0.015** -0.015** -0.012* -0.009* -0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(household income) 0.358** 0.322** 0.209** 0.312** 0.231** 0.211** 0.203** 0.221**
(0.043) (0.041) (0.046) (0.045) (0.099) (0.104) (0.102) (0.100)
Husband’s age -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002
(0.141) (0.143) (0.141) (0.141) (0.112) (0.102) (0.104) (0.110)
Husband’s age squared 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Primary education husband 0.332 0.343
(0.321) (0.238)
Tertiary education husband 0.143 0.148
(0.130) (0.098)
French-speaking husband -0.288** -0.273** -0.281** -0.282** -0.121 -0.112 -0.110 -0.114
(0.139) (0.131) (0.134) (0.131) (0.101) (0.103) (0.093) (0.106)
Italian-speaking husband -0.362 -0.329 -0.332 -0.348 -0.346 -0.311 -0.332 -0.312
(0.281) (0.282) (0.285) (0.282) (0.201) (0.203) (0.199) (0.209)
Log(number of children) -0.202 -0.093
(0.129) (0.089)
Constant -1.321 3.467
(0.939) (2.82)
Number of households 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108
Log likelihood -1201.3 -1199.4 -1271.6 -1005.2 -1003.5 -1006.5
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.092 0.059 0.099 0.061 0.116 0.074 0.101 0.072
Notes: Satisfaction with financial situation and satisfaction with life are the dependent variables. The responses for these subjective
satisfaction measures range from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (fully satisfied). The female partner’s income contribution
measures the ratio of total household income contributed by the female partner and is scaled between 0 and 100. Men’s
mothers are classified as not working if they were not in the labor force when their sons were 15 years old. The interaction
term is constructed by interacting the female partner’s income contribution and the binary variable indicating whether or
not the mother was working when her son was 15 years old. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. */** Statistically
significant at the 5-/1-percent level.
5 Conclusion
This paper reexamined Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti’s (2004) idea that the increasing
proportion of men who were raised in a family with a working mother caused a significant
increase in the female labor force participation rate using the Swiss Household Panel
2005. My results indicated that the working decision of a man’s mother determines his
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attitude toward having a working wife. Men who grew up in a traditionally structured
household tend to dislike working wives and their disutility of having a working wife
makes it less likely that they marry a woman that is more likely to participate in the
labor market. The well-being of men who were brought up by a working mother is,
however, not significantly affected by the labor force participation of their wives.
More precisely, I showed that the life satisfaction and the financial satisfaction of
a married man are affected negatively by his wife’s contribution to household income.
However, this effect is not significant for men who grew up in a family with a working
mother. These crucial differences in satisfaction levels are interpreted as an indication
of varying preferences because of exposure to certain sexual stereotypes early in life.
Moreover, it provides a reason for including the former labor market status of a husband’s
mother as a proxy variable for his gender role attitudes in the estimation of the working
decision of his wife. I also presented evidence that Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti’s
(2004) cross-section results can also be found in Swiss data and that the probability
of whether a man’s wife is working is affected positively by the former labor market
status of his mother. The effect remains significantly positive even when controlling for
a variety of characteristics, socioeconomic background and whether the wife’s mother
worked. Depending on the specification, a married woman’s probability of working is
approximately 7 to 8 percentage points higher when her mother-in-law worked.
This paper is a further contribution to the literature analyzing the interaction between
the economy, attitudes and social norms. Besides showing that there is a substantial link
between the proportion of men who were brought up by a working mother and the female
labor market participation rate, I presented evidence that gender role attitudes differ
crucially according to the role model men were confronted with early in life. The results
discussed above also support the preference channel as the relevant dynamic mechanism
behind the increase in the female labor market participation described in Ferna´ndez,
Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) by directly establishing a link between the wife’s labor market
integration and the husband’s satisfaction depending on their mothers’ former labor force
status.
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